일간베스트 저장소

                                   미 CIA 리포트 구경하기 

아래는 2007년 미CIA가 기밀해제한 1980년 5월 9일자 비밀 문서 1건(3쪽)이다. 1급비밀이라고 분류된 문서의 내용을 보면 전적으로 1980.5.9. 당시의 한국 사회 정세를 개관한 내용이다. 

핵생 데모, 노동자 데모, 데모 세력에 동조하는 야권의 행태가 사회불안을 야기하고 있고, 이에 대해 정부와 계엄당국은 5개사단, 특전부대, 수경사 등 병력투입을 준비하고 있다는 정도의 브리핑 식 남한 정세 개관이 담겨있다. 계엄당국이 군부대를 투입할 경우, 군이 권력을 장악할 우려가 있어 관찰 중이고, 한국정부에 이에 대한 경고를 해야 하느냐에 대해 깊이 생각하고 있다는 내용, 북한의 오판을 부를 수 있어 걱정이 된다는 내용, 만일 미국이 남아시아 문제와 미국 내부의 상황에 얽매어 힘이 약화되는 순간이라고 북한이 판단하는 순간, 북한은 이 무질서의 틈을 적극 이용하여 무력통일의 찬스로 이용할 가능성이 있다는 간단한 정세 브리핑 내용에 불과한 문서다. 

2008년에 내가 펴낸 “수사기록으로 본 12.12와 5.18”이라는 제목의 역사책 4권중 제1권에는 5.18당시의 한국 정치상황과 북한의 동향 내용들이 자세하게 실려 있다. 아래의 미 CIA보고서는 위 책 내용 중 지극히 초보적 일부에 해당한다. 나는 이 책을 쓸 때, 계엄당국이 판단한 정보 보고서를 모두 참작했지만, 아래 CIA 보고서는 군사지식이 많이 부족해 보인다. 

이런 내용을 놓고 오늘 광주는 미국자료를 허위로 왜곡했다.  광주 빨갱이들은 대부분의 한국인을 무시하고 단지 “미국” "미국 대사" "미 CIA"라는 이름만 땄다. 마치 나무에서 한 두 개의 이파리를 떼어다 활용하듯이 미국이라는 국력을 5.18을 왜곡하기 위해 국민을 농락하고 있다. 

5.18에 관한 한, 빨갱이들이 대국으로 여기는 중국으로부터의 정보가 더욱 자세할 것이다. 5.18 게릴라 폭동을 모택동이 김일성에 조언했다는 내용인 것이다. 다른 국민들은 몰라도 빨갱이들은 이 내용을 100% 신뢰해야 할 것이다.

출처 

http://news.joins.com/article/21151502 (중앙일보)

Growing Unrest in South Korea and Prospects

for Takeover by Military Strongman Chon Doo Hwan

Current reporting indicates that the level of anti government

activities by South Korean students. supported by opposition political

leaders and workers. is coming to a head. Student activists and

sympathizers have enumerated a series of demands and set a deadline

of 14 May for government action. failing which they threaten demonstrations in the streets.

ROK authorities are reportedly devising a series of steps to forestall a confrontation.

with the use of force the last resort. It appears doubtful. however. that the activists

will respond to government pleas for moderation. The outcome of clashes

students and troops, if they occur. will depend on the response of

several key actors. and certainly on the state of mind and the role 

played by military strongman Chon Doo Hwan.

While what we have observed of north korean reactions to 

developments in the South since the Park assassination does not yet

suggest an intention to exploit the situation militarily.

I continue to be concerned about the adequacy of warning on Korea.

In this light. the current South Korean unrest. which brings with it the

possibility of a military takeover. is yet another in a series of

recent events that could undermine stability in the South and tempt

Pyonyang to attack.

These developments have caused great concern among ROK officials.

particularly since they are occurring at a time of labor unrest.

Officials are particularly alarmed about the possibility that student and labor

demonstrators will join forces in the streets. President Choi is

reported to be considering a variety of measures to deal with these

threats but probably lacks the will and ability to act decisively.

The ROK Army Chief of Staff placed the infantry regiments of five divisions.

the Special Warfare Command. and the Capital Security Command on standby

alert. They are to be prepared to move into Seoul to support Martial

Law Command efforts to control student demonstrators. On 6-7 May.

two special forces brigades moved into the Seoul area. 

joining four others garrisoned there.

The outcome of clashes between students and troops would depend

upon the reactions of opposition figures. the business community.and

the general public. Opposition political leaders already have expressed

support for some student demands and have called for a special National

Assembly session later this month to discuss the situation. Sympathy 

for the students among other elements. however. is limited. The

majority of South Koreans probably hope that actions which might lead

to instability. to a military dictatorship. and to a loss of foreign--

and especially US--confidence can be avoided. It is possible. therefore.

that the authorities would be able to suppress student activism without

causing the confrontation to spread to other sectors of society. It is also

possible. however. that such clashes--especially if they involved loss

of civilian life-- might bring workers and opposition political leaders

into the confrontation and rupture the process of political reconstruction

under way since President Park's assassination.

the attitude and role of military strongman Lt. Gen. Chon Doo Hwan

with respect to these developments probably will be decisive.

All of the actors in this situation will. however. be very mindful

of US Government attitudes. Student and opposition party leaders will be

looking to the United States to restrain and inhibit crackdowns by the ROK

Government and the military. Chon himself will want to avoid as much as

possible provoking US reactions that could undermine his position or the

United States is out to get him and that his power within the ROK military

is eroding as a result. he may be prepared to discount US attitudes in the

interest of raking full control of the government.

North Korea does not currently appear to be taking any military steps

in response to the deteriorating political situation in the South.

however. the events of 26 October and 12 December 1979 caught the North

by surprise. That is not true of the present situation. As me pointed

out in SNIE 42/14.2-79. 20 December 1979. and in an Alert Memorandum.

8 February 1980. the emergence of widespread civil disorder in the South

would prompt Pyongyang to consider forceful reunification of the peninsula.

If Washington were seen to be preoccupied with the situation in South

Asia and domestic issues. Pyongyang would probably be further emboldened

by a conclusion that the US capacity to resolve the situation in the

South or to defend South Korea was seriously weakened.